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THE CONSIDERATION OF A CONTRACT.
No. II.
§ 27.-Forearance of a R ight of Actio.-An agreement to
forbear to institute or. prosecute legal proceedings for any legal
right-or demand, is a valid consideration for a promise to pay a debt
or a sum of money additional to that due, or to do any other lawful
act.' The debtor receives a benefit from the delay, as the time for
meeting his liabilities is extended. The creditor stays the processes
of the law for the collection of his dues. He may thereby receive
an injury from the subsequent irresponsibility of the debtor, or from
the loss of the benefit which the present use of the right or invest-
ment of the property he claims would contribute. - It is immaterial
whether the time of forbearance is long or short, provided it be cer-
tain; or whether any actual injury results to the one party from the
forbearance or actual benefit to the other. The forbearance need
not be adequate to thd consideration promised. It will sustain a pro-
I Com. Dig. Ass. B., Bidwell vs. Catton, Hob. 216. Forth vs. Stanton, 1 Saund.
(Williams) 210, note; Selwyn N. P. Ass. 44. Colgin vs. Henley, 6 Leigh. 85. Ford
vs. Rehman Wright, 434; 17 Vt. 58. Call vs. Calef, 4 Cush. 388.
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mise to pay a much larger sum than the original claim, inasmuch as a
smaller sum may be worth more now than a much larger at a future
time.' It is immaterial whether the forbearance is the consideration
of a promise of the party liable to suit, or of a third .person, as in
either case an equal injury results to the party who forbears.2 Nor is
it necessary that the forbearance be extended at the instance of the
party liable to suit, where it is the consideration of the promise of
a third person.3 Forbearance is generally the consideration, of the
guaranty of an existing debt, as when the payee of a note agrees
to forbear to sue the maker for one year-in consideration of the
guaranty of a third person to ensure its payment.4  It will sustain
the promise of a. person bound only in a representative cipacity, so
as to render him personally liable de bonis propriis8, also the pro-
mise of a debtor to pay the assignee of a debt so as to enable the
latter to sue in his own name. 6
§ 28.-The forbearance necessary to uphold a promise, need not
amount to an entire discharge. It may be for a definite and
limited time7 -for a reasonable and convenient time--or it may be
general in its terms.9 If it is for a reasonable time, such forbear-
ance must be averred in an *action on the promise, and.the Court
will decide whether it is or not." If it is' general in. its terms,-it
'Smith vs. Algar, t B.'&"Ad. 603.
ZRolL Abr. 27, PL 45. Came vs. Richafds, Cro. Car.'278. -Th6rne vs. Fler,
Cro. Jac. 896. King vs. Upton, 4 ilreenl. M4. Watson vs. Randalls,120 Wend; 201.
Silyis vs. Ely, 8 W. & S. 420. Jennison vs. Stafford, 1 Cush. 168.
3Rood vs. Jones, 1 Dong. (Mich.) 188.
4 Sage'vs. Wilcox, 6 CObnn. 81.
5 Barber vs. Fox, 1 Sdimd. (Wlians) 187, note a. Id.'210, note b. Emnet v8.
Kearnes, 7 Dowl. 630. Rood bs. "Mi6s, 1 Dbng. (Mdih.) 88.
'1 Roll Abr. 20 pL 11, 12. -Morton vs. Bum, 7-A. & E. -19.
7 Matar6 vs. West, Cro. llz. 665.
8 Lugen vs. Broughton,: 3Balst 206. Sidwel vs. Evans, 1 Penn. 888.
5 Msyv*. Alvaies, Cro. EIz. 887. Down'nfg vs.'Friu, 4 Johns. 239. Gilesvs.
Ackles, 9 Barr. 147; Contra. Phillips vs. Sackford, Oro. Eliz..445. See Rix vs. Adams,
9 Vt. 283.
10Powell on Cont. 854; 1 Sid. 45; 7 B. & C. 423. BIting'vs. Vanderlyn, 4 Johns.
237.
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will be presumed to be absolute and perpetual and the promise
resting on such forbearance is discharged whenever the suit to be
forborne is commenced.2  But forbearancefor some time, a sh]ort time,
a little time, (pro aliquo tempore, per breve autpaululum tempus,)
is too shadowy.for judicial determination, and too indefinite to be of
benefit to the debtor, or detriment to the creditor, and will not
support a promise, even though the creditor forbears a long time.3
If, however, it is to continue "for some little time, (pro aliquo
tempore,) to wit: for a fortnight or thereabouts," it is sufficient, the
videlicet furnishing a measure of reasonable certainty.' So, also,
where the agreement is "to givefurther time for payment,"5-- to
forbear "until the defendant should be able,6 or "till a person comes
to London,"7 or "sends to Liverpool,"" it is sufficient, a reasonable
time being intended for the fulfilment of those conditions. 9
§ 29.-The stipulated forbearance may be to desist from a suit at
law or irk equity,10 or from a further claim before a justice of the
peace -- from a proceeding on a capiu8 utlagatum'--to delay or
discontinue a trial before issue joined, or execution after judgment
rendered" --to discharge a debtor from custody or execution, 5 or
'Com. Dig. Ass. B. Theme vs. Fuller, Cro. Jac. 396. Mapes vs. Sidney, Id. 684.
Hamaker vs. Eberly, 2 Binn. 506. Sidwell vs. Evans, 1 Penn. 383. Lonsdale vs.
Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. 151.
2 Clark vs. Russell, 3"Watts. 213.
3 Lutwich vs. Hussby, Cro. Eliz. 19. Tricket vs. Mandlee, 1 Sid. 45. Sidwell vs.
Evans, 1 Penn. 385. Lonsaale vs. Brown, 4 Wash. C, C. 151. "Breve tempus is
uncertain, and non constat, what time it is," Cro. Jac. 250.
' Baker vs. Jacob, 1 Balst. 41. Lonsdale vs. Brown, supra.
5 King vs. Upton, 4 Greenl. 387. 6 Lonsdale vs. Brown, supra.
7 Quick vs. Copleston, 1 Sid. 242. 8 Tricket vs. Mandlee, 1 Sid. 45.
- So, where the declaration averred an argument to forbear, as the consideration,
without stating the time, it was held after verdict sufficient, for a reasonable time
shall be intended, and that is an ample consideration, Mapes vs. Sidney, Cro. Jac. 683.
I D1wdenay vs. Oland, Cro. Eliz. 768. Coulston vs. Calt, Cro. Eliz. 847.
1 Rippon vs. Norton, Cro. Eliz. 881.
2 Jennings vs. Harley, Cro. Eliz. 909; S. C. Yelv. 19.
"Hamaker vs. 'Eberly, 2 Binn. 509. McKelvy vs. Wilson, 9 Barr. 183.
1, Lent vs. Padelford, 10 Miss. 230. Train vs. Gold, 5 Pick. 380. Selvis vs. Ely,
3 W. & S. 420. Brice vs. Clark, 8 Barr. 301." Giles vs. Ackles, 9 Id. 147.
15 Atkinson vs. Bayntum, 1 Bing. N. C. 444. Giles vs. Ackles, supra.
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to delay or discontinue any other judicial proceedings. The for-
bearance of a cause of action, yet to accrue, as well as of one
already existing is sufficient. Therefore the promise of a surety
to forbear suit against his principal after payment of the debt by
himself, is a valid consideration for a promise of indemnity.1
§ 30.-There must be a cause of action present or prospective,
not a mere unfounded claim, in order to constitute the forbearance
a valid consideration.2 If there is none, no injury will result to the
one party, or benefit to the other, from. the delay. Forbear-
ance to sue a widow on a note given during coverture, 3 or an adult
on a bond given by him as surety, in infancy,4 or a joint obligor
on a bond after his co-obligor has been released,' or an heir on the
bond of his ancestor, in which he is not expressly bounds or on a
note given by the maker during'his intoxication,7 or to procure a
discharge from an illegal arrest," is no consideration; nor will for-*
bearance to sue, where there are no parties liable to suit,9 or to levy
execution on property in which the debtor has no interest,10 or no
interest liable to be levied on, constitute a consideration. The for-
bearance of judicial proceedings, instituted without cause, is, as we
have seen, and as has recently been decided by the highest judicial
authority, no consideration for a promise, at least if they were
known to be causeless by the party instituting them, and to whom
the promise was made." The same rule, notwithstanding some early
conflicting dicta, applies whether they are yet to be commenced,
IHamaker vs. Eberly, 2 Binn. 506.
2 Tooley vs. Windham, Cro. Eliz. 206. Hamaker vs. Eberly, supra: Powell on
Cont. 354.
3 Lloyd vs. Lee, 1 Str. 94. 4 Latch, 142.
5 Hammon vs. Roll, March, 202. 8 Dowl. 604.
61 Lev. 165. Barber vs. Fox, 2 Saund. 136...
7 Newell vs. Fisher, 11 S. & M. 431.
8 Atkinson vs. Settree, 'Willes, 482. Commonwealth vs. Johnson, 3 Cush. 454.
9 Style, 248. Jones vs. Ashburnham, 4 East. 455. Nelson vs. Searle, 4 L. & W.
795.
"'Rood vs. Jones, 1 Dong. (Mich.) 188.,
11 Wade vs. Simeon, 2 C. B. 548. Per Tindal, C. J. Smith vs. Monteith, 13 Il.
& W. 427.
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or are already.depending.1 But it is sufficient if the event of the
suit admits of honest doubt, and the burden of proof is on the
party who has promised in consideration of the promise to forbear,
to show that no action could have been maintained.2
§ 81.-Forbearance is a valid consideration, notwithstanding a
parol agreement or a covenant not to* sue for a limited time, will
not bar an immediate actiobn, since damages may be recovered for
its breach.3  It cannot be barred by anything less than a perpetual
covenant amounting to a release. But in order to constitute the
forbearance a consideration, the promise founded on it and the
promise to forbear, must be mutually binding, so as to create a
right of action on the breach of either.'
§ 32.-ompromie of a right of action.-Compromises of doubt-
ful and conflicting rights, and all agreements entered into in good.
faith for the purpose of settling accounts, adjusting boundaries, or
otherwise preventing litigation, which are not contrary to law or
public policy, arp sustained by the courts. 5  Such compromises are
favored by the law, which seeks to disburdei' the courts, and facili-
tate the settlement of disputes by the parties themselves. They
are illustrated by mutual submissions to arbitration,6 which must be
mutually binding,7 and by waivers of legal and equitable rights and
See cases cited in the preceding note.
2 Bidwell vs. Catton, Hob. 216. Longridge vs. Dorville, 5 B. & Al. 117. Blake
vs. Peck, 11 Vt. 483. Truett v& Chaplin, 4 Hawks. 181. Gould vs. Armstrong, 2
Hal]. 266.
'Thimbleby vs. Barron, 8 . & W. 210. Cuyler vs. Cuyler, 2 Johns. 186.
Chandler vs. Herrick, 19 Id. 129. Reed vs. Shaw, 1 Blackf. 245, note (1). Berry
vs. Bates, 2 Id. 118. Mendenhall vs. Lenwell, 5 Id. 125. Lowe vs. Blair, 6 Id.
282. Clark vs. Snelling, 1 Smith (Ind.) 201. This rnle'is of ancient origin. See
Ayloffe vs. Sirman, Carth, 63. S. C. 1 Show, 46. Comb. 122;- 2 Salk. 573.
4 Chitty on Cont. 44." Cobb vs. Page, 17 Penn. State, 469.
5 Penu vs. Lord Baltimore, 1 Yes. Sen. 450. Cann vs. Cann, 1 P. W. 727. Atlee
vs. Backhouse, 3 I. & W., 648. Covode vs. McKelvy, Addison 56. Lane vs. Lane,
6 Munf. 405. Truett vs. Chaplin, 4 Hawks, 178. Brown vs. Sloan, 6 Watts 421.
Rice vs. Bixler, 1 W. & S. 454. Okeson vs. Barclay, 2 Penn. 581. McKinley vs.
Vatkins, 13 Ill. 140.
-
6 Com. Dig. Ass. B. 2, 9. Jones vs. Boston Mill Corp. 4 Pick 507. Hodges vs.
Saunders, 17 Id. 470.
lChitty on Cont. 44.
THE CONSIDERATION OF A CONTRACT.
defences,' the validity of which, as considerations is independent of
subsequent judicial decisions.2  The doubt or conflict may consist
in matter of law, or fact, or in any of the uncertain issues of a trial.
A mere unfounded claim will not support a compromise, 3 but an
honest doubt as to its validity is sufficient.4  The abandonment of a
suit in which the public have an interest, is against public policy,
and therefore no consideration, such for instance as the prosecution
of a petition against the right of a person to hold a public office
which he has attained by bribery.'
§ 33.-Compromises are not affected by the subsequent adjudica-
tion of any legal question, the discovery of any new fact, or any
other event which settles the right in either of the parties, and
would, if previously known, have prevented him-from entering into
them. They are designed to conclude disputes in which the right
may be entirely on one side, and must rest, if at all, on the circum-
stances and means of knowledge existing at the time they were
made, or else they would be so contingent as not to be resorted to.5
The arrangement, as we have seen, must be entered into in good
faith. If the parties have not equal knowledge, .or equhl means of
knowledge of the circumstances which determine their rights; and
I Stebbins vs. Smith, 4 Pick. 97. Smith vs. Weed, 20 Wend. 477. Williams vs.
Alexander, 4 Iredell Eq. 207. Nicholson vs, May, Wright, 660, 9 Cow. 266.
2 5 Peters 114. The waiver of a tort is sufficient. Davis vs. Morgan, 4 B. & C. 8.
Brealey vs. Andrew, 7 A. & E. 108.
3 Edwards vs. Baugh, 11 M. & W. 641. The later English authorities seem to
limit the binding force of agreements to compromise, not yet executed, to cases
where there are cross demands. Bridgman vs. Dean, 8 Eng. Law & Equity, 534.
4 Longridge vs. Dorville, 5 B. & Al. 117.
sCoppock vs. Bower, 4 M. & W. 360. Kier vs. Leeman, 9 Q. B. 371. Gardner
vs. Maxey, 9 B. Monr. 90.. Clark vs. Ricker, 14 N. H. 44. But a civil action for
an injury punishable criminally, may be compromised. Walbridge vs. Arnold; 21
Conn. 424.
6 Stapilton vs. Stapilton, 1 Atk. 10; Leonard vs. Leonard, 2 Ball & B. 79; Pick-
ering vs. Pickering, 2 Beav. 31; Stewart vs. Stewart, 2 Clark & Finelly, 966; Tay-
lor vs. Patrick, 1 Bibb, 168; Fisher vs. May, 2 Id. 448; Moore vs. Fitzwater, 2
Rand. 442; Bennett vs. Paine, 5 Watts, 259; Lyon vs. Richmond, 2 Johns Ch. 51.
Holcomb vs. Stimpson, 8 Vt. 141; Bailey vs. Wilson, 1 Dev. & Bat. Ch. 182;" Rus-
sell vs. Cook, 3 Hill, 504; Barlow vs. The Ocean Insurance Company, 4 Met. 270;
Allis vs. Billings, 2 Cush. 25.
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either has practised undue advantage on the other, it will be set
aside in equity.' But it will not be impeached for mere mistake of
the law by either, where no deception was practised on him.' it
will be scrutinized by the courts whenever any fiduciary relation has
existed between them', as that of executor and devisee, insured and
insurer, requiring the one to disclose freely all the facts to the other.'
§ 34.-Here it may be remarked generally that the considerations
already mentioned; cease to: be such, when the benefit is conferred
gratuitounsjy and will not support even a subsequent promise-that
such benefit cannot be considered gratuitous where it is accompa-
nied with a request and promise on the part of the recipient, and
that the request and promise may be implied from circumstances.'
They are very often implied when the consideration consists of work
performed or goods sold, and are more easily implied in some caseq
than in others-as where a father's promise to pay for clothing fur-
nished by a tailor to his minor son, which was worn by the son with
the knowledge of the father, and without his dissent, was implied.5
These points will be discussed under the head of executed conside-
rations.6 And here closes the classification of valid considerations.
§ 35.-Invalid con8sderations classfied.-These terms, as we have
said, are not strictly correct, but are dictated by convenience. In
discussing such as are invalid, valid considerations will necessarily
be mentioned. Invalid considerations consist in general of gratui-
tous promises in which one party engages to do some act beneficial
to another, without the latter's promise to do anything in return.
The law refuses to execute them as they involve no benefit to the
promissor, or injury to the promisee.
'Leonard vs. Leonard, 2 Ball & B. 171, 181; Truett vs. Chaplin, 4 Hawks, 178;
Hoge vs. Hoge, 1 Watts, 216, 4 Met. 270, 4 Ves. 850, 1 Story Eq. Juris. 181.
2 Shotwell vs. Murray, 1 Johns. Ch. 512; Lyon vs- Richmond, 2 Id. 51; Taylor
vs. Patrick, 1 Bibb, 168; Fisher vs. May, 2 Id. 44; Stewart vs. Stewart, 6 Clark &
Fi. 968'
3Pickering v8. Pickering, 2 Beav. 31.
4 See J 46 and cases cited. Nomo pre.umitur donare. Moreton v8. Noble, 1 La.
Ann, 192.
5 Law vs. Wilkins, 6 A. & E. 718.
6 See J 45, 46.
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§ 36.-General illustrations. A motive, as an executor's regard
for the wishes of his testator'-or an expectation as of marriage,' is
not a valid consideration. Love, affection, gratitude, relationship,
which are technically called good' in contradistinction to valuable
considerations, will not give validity to a promise when made by a
parent to his child, or by a child to his parent.4 Gifts are upheld
by the law provided the rights of third parties are not prejudiced-
but delivery is necessary to complete them.5  The same principle
applies to a donatio causa mortis as to a donatio inter vivos. 6 Equity
will not enforce a mere voluntary contract or moral obligation-
even between parties standing in intimate relations to each other.7
The later authorities sustain the doctrine that the meritorious con-
sideration of affection for wife and children will not justify its in-
terposition.8 But if such a contract has been executed;'so that
nothing further remaing to be done by the parties, equity will not
allow it to be revoked. 9  The promise of a father to pay the exist-
ing debt of his son, and the promise of the son to pay that of the
father are not binding, unless some new consideration intervenes at
1Thomas vs. Thomas, 2 Q. B. 851 ; S. C. 2 G. k.D. 226.
2 Raymond vs. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480.
32 Bla. Comm. 444; Gully vs. The Bishop of Ex6ter, 10 B. & 0. 584; Van Der-
veer vs. Wright, 6 Barb. 547; Duvoll vs. Wilson, 9 Id. 487.
4 Pennington vs. Gittings, 2 G. & J. 208; Holliday vs. Atkinson; 5 B & C. 501;
Grover vs. Grover, 24 Pick. 261; Hill vs. Buckminister, 5 Id. 391 ; Story, Notes,
1184.
6 Noble vs. Smith, 2 Johns. 52 ; Pearson vs. Pearson, 7 Id. 26; Fowler vs. Stew-
art, 1 McCord, 504; Ewing vs. Ewing, 2 Leigh, 337. It was held in Smith vs. Smith,
7 C. & P. 401, that a father's gift of a watch to his minor child cannot be revoked.
6 Parish vs. Stone, 14 Pick. 198; Carpenter vs.' Dodge, 20 Vt. 595.
7 Colman vs. Sarrel, 1 "Ves. Jr. 50; Ellison vs. Ellison, 6 Id. 656; Tufaell vs.
Constable, 8 Sim. 69; Black vs: McCord, 2 H. & G. 100; 1 Fonb. Eq. Bk. 1, C&. v.
2; 2 Story Eq. Juris. 1 793, (a)."
8 Holloway vs. Headington, 8 Sim. 325; Jeffreys vs. Jefreys, 1 Craig & Phillips,
138; Van Derveer vs. Wright, 6 Barb. 547; Duvoll vs. Wilson, 9 Id. 487; 2"Story
Eq. Juris. 793, (b).
9 Fortescue vs. Barnet, 3 M. & K. 36; Minturn vs. Seymour, 4 Johns. Ch. 498; 2
Story Eq. Juris. 1 706, (a).
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the request of the promisor.' The promise of a party to pay a
debt absolutely, for which he is liable only in a particular right or
representative capacity, is not binding without some additional bene-
fit to extend his liability.2  So also the promise of the purchaser
of real or personal estate to the seller after the property has passed,
not to employ it for a particular purpose, 3 or to pay an additional
sum beyond the purchase money 4 is of no effect. A mere offer, as
we have seen, unaccepted, is without consideration, and may be
withdrawn. 5  The transfer of a bargain which is closed, may be a
valid consideration-but that of a mere offer which is not binding,
or of an agreement which is void for any reason, is not.6 An agree-
ment to convey land to a party in consideration of his promise to
settle upon it, will not be enforced in equity.7
'Mills vs. Wyman, 3 Pick. 307; Cook vs. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; Parker vs. Carter,
4 Munf. 279. So the promise of a father to pay the expense incurred in the sup-
port of his minor children taken from him without his consent, he having furnished
reasonable support for them at home is of no effect. Dodge vs. Adams, 19 Pick.
429; Chilcott vs. Trimble, 13 Barb. 502.
2 Wennall vs. Adney, a B. & P. 249, note; Rann vs Hughes, 7 T. R. 350; Ten
Eyck vs. Vanderpool, 8 Johns. 120; Try vs. Topping, 9 Wend. 273, 5 Binn. 33. The
surrender of the creditor's security was held a suflicient consideration for an exeeu-
to's promise to pay the defendant's debt-there being sufficient assets. btebbins
vs. Smith, 4 Pick. 97.
3Geer vs. Archer, 2 Barb. 420.
4 Hawley vs. Farrar, 1 Vt. 420. So where a promise was made to make up the
deficiency in land sold, which proved less ia area than was "supposed" in the de-
scriptive clause; Smith vs. Ware, 13 John 257 ; Wiliams vs. Hathaway, 19 Pick.
387 ; or to make up for the unsoundness of a slave after sale-there being no fraud
or warranty; Hatchell vs. Odom, 2 D. & Ba. 302, or for the purpose of quieting the
seller's complaints as to the inadequacy of the price. Tryon vs. Mooney, 9 Johns.
858; Geer vs. Archer, 2 Barb. 420.
5 See 124. 1
6 Carleton vs. Jackson, 21- Vt. 481 ; Eh Ie vs. Iudson, 24 Wend. 97; North vs. Fo-
rest, 15" Conn. 400; Silvernail vs. Cole, 12 Barb. 685. But see McKier vs. Har-
wood, (S. C. of Ala. Jan. 1849,) 12 Law Rep. 157. A voidnote is no consideration
for a new one. Commonwealth vs. Whitney, 1 Met. 21.
7 Reed vs. Vannorsdale, 2 Lqigh. 569; Forward vs. Armstead, 12 Ala. 124, 13 Ves.
Jr. 158.
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§ 37.-Part payment of a Debt in satisfactin of thAe whole.-
The promise of a creditor to accept part payment of a debt in satis-
faction of the whole or to accept the payment of one debt in satis-
faction of two distinct claims, or to forbear suit for the residue of
a debt on payment of a part; or not to look to one maker 6f a
joint and several note for the residue on the other maker's payment
of part, will not be recognized as binding.' The creditor being
entitled to the entire amouut of his claim at the appointed time
receives no benefit from the partial payment which the law will
recognize, and his promise to remit a part differs not from a promise
to bestow a gratuity. The debtor does no more than his duty when
he pays a paft of the debt. ' But the creditor's 'promise'to accept
part payment in satisfaction of the whole claim, if he is to receive
in consideration therefor any collateral benefit, as payment of a
less sum before the note.or other claim becomes due,' or at another
place more beneficial than the one appointed,' or to be secured by
the responsibility of a third person as indorser or surety,5 is valid.
But additional security is not a consideration, unless the debtor is
bound to furnish it.6  In these cases the claim may be more valua-
I Cumber vs. Wane, 1 Str. 426; Heatheote vs. Crookshanks, 2 T. R. 24; Pabodie
vs. King, 12 Johns. 426; Hall -vs. Constant, 2 Hall, 185, 1 Dev. Ch. 429, 3 Harring.
366 3 Miss. 453; Cutter vs. Reynolds, 8 B. Munr. 576; Barrow vs. Vandevert, 13
Ala. 232; Bailey vs. Day, 26 Maine, 88; Jenners vs. Lane, Id. 475; Pomeroy vs.
Slade, 16 Vt. 220 ; Daniels vs. Hatch, 1 Zabriskie, 391 ;, Greenwood vs. Ledbetter,
12 Price, 183; Smith vs. Bartholomew, 1 Met. 276; Warren vs. Skinner, 20 Conn.
559. Nor will the actual acceptance o" part bar an action for the residue. Fitch
vs. Sutton, 5 East. 230.
2 Heathcote vs. Crookshanks, 2 T. R. 27 ; Fitch vs. Sutton, 5 East, 2 3, per Lord
Ellenborough.
'Bailey vs. Day, 26 Maine, 88; Brooks vs. White, 2 Met. 283.
4 Co. Litt. 212 (b); Harpbr vs. Graham, 20 Ohio, 105.
5 Boyd vs. Hitchcock, 20 Johns. 7&; Kellogg vs. Richards, 14 Wend. 116; Phillips
vs. Berger, 2 Barb. 608; Browne vs. Stackpole, 9 N. H. 478; Gunn vs. MeArder, 2 Ire-
dell Ch. 72; or the personal responsibility of an executor for his testator's debt. 'Gor-
ing vs. Goring, Yelv. 10, 11. Contra 1 Speare, 368, which cannot be law. The true
doctrine is held in Steinman vs. Magnus, 2 Campb. 124; S. C. 11 East, 390; and
the agreement is binding even before the smaller sum is accepted. Bradley vs.
Gregory, 2 Campb. 388.
6 Acker vs. Phoenix, 4 Paige, 305.
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ble when secured or fraud would be done to the surety, if the pay-
ment of the less sum was not a satisfaction; and whether it
depends on an uncertain security or not, if it is not now due, pre-
sent payment of a part may be more valuable than the future pay-
ment of the whole.' * A debt payable in money will be discharged,
if the creditor receives in full satisfaction from his debtor other
species of property, as land,2 a chattel,3 a -chose in action, as the
note of a third person,' stocks and outstanding debts.5  The satis-
faction must be proved to be equivalent, or to be received as equiva-
lent. If "so received it will discharge the debt, though far less
valuable than the amount in money. it is in the nature of an
exchange of property, and the law in this as in all contracts, will
not fix prices for parties, or equalize the obligations. they have volun-
tarily incurred,
§ 38.-It has been held that a composition between an insolvent'
debtor and his creditor, not under sea], is no defence to an action
brought by any one creditor, unless, perhaps, all the debtor's pro-
porty was assigned to trustees for distribution.6  But the better doc-"
trine is, that such- compositions are in general binding on all the
parties, since, if any one creditor was allowed to sue for the residue,
fraud would be done to the rest who were induced to join in it by
his prornis.c A sealed acquittance of an entire debt on receiving
'Stein:n rs. Magnus, 11 East. 390. See 6 Am. Law Mag. 18.
2 HoWe 1.. 'Kay, 5 Pick. 44.
3 Litt. 344; Pinnel's Case, 5 Co. 117.
4 Brofks , s. White, 2 Met. 283; Lee vs. Oppenheimer, 82 Maine, 253; Logan vs.
Lite, 5 lxiig. ,Ark.) 585. The negotiale promissory note of the debtor for a smaller
sum than the amount due is now held a bar. Sibree vs. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23.
1n general it would seem that the change of the security would make the payment
1,. a inaller sum a satisfaction of a larger. Silvers vs. Reynolds, 2 Harrison, 275;
teiliiu.i re. Smith, 4 Pick. 97.
r, all in.,on vs. Inglesby, 5 Johns. 386. The rule of law stated in this section
has Iltwi discountenanced in Kellogg vs. Richards, 14 Wend. 116; Brooks vs. White,
2 Met. 283; Harper vs. Graham, 20 Ohio, 105. But the reasons urged against it are
equally applicable to the well settled doctrine of the common law, which renders a
consideration necessary to the legal obligation of a promise.
6 Heathcote vs. Crookshanks; 2 T. R. 24"; Fitch vs. Sutton, 5 East, 230.
7 Boothby vs. Sowden, 3 Camp. 174; Wood viT. Roberts, 2 Stark. 368 ; Cockshott
vs. Bennett, 2 T. R. 763; Butler vs. Rhodes, 1 Esp. 236; S. C. Peake, 238; "Evans
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a part discharges the residue,' and where the debt is an unliquidated
demand, or bona fide differences exist as to the amount due, an
agreement to accept a sum certain is binding. 2
§ 3 9 .- Charitable Subscritions.-The multitude and variety of
such subscriptions to public institutions and private enterprises of
benevolence render it important to inquire when are they supported
by legal considerations. According to the analogies of the law,
the subscriber should be bound to the extent his subscription has
authofized others to make advances which they have actually made,
or to incur liabilities which they have actually incurred in effecting
its purpose before they have received from him notice of his dissent
or withdrawal of his name. His signature clothed others with
authority to pledge his credit, and he should be bound by their acts
duly performed within the scope of that authority before its revo-
cation. To, this extent the binding force of such subscriptions is
well settled.3 Thus, if several persons sign a paper pledging cer-
tain sums to the support of a newspaper and appoint a person to
manage it, they are bound to him for his outlays under the stipu-
vs. Powis, 1 Exeh. 601; Good vs. Chessman, 2 B. & Ad. 828; Browne vs. Stack~pole,
9 N. H. 478; Daniels vs. Hatch, 1 Zabriskie, 391; Fellows vs. Stevens, 23 Wend.
294t; Warren vs. Skinner, 20 Conn. 559; Ray vs. Price, 3 Tyrwh. 59.6. And a pri-
vate agreement with one creditor unknown to the other creditors, to make his debt
good, is a fraud on them, and not binding. Cockshott vs. Bennett, iura; Lewis vs.
Jones, 4 B. & C. 511; Trumbull vs. Tilton, 1 Foster N. H. 128.
' Co. Litt. 212 (b); Knight vs. Cox, Bull. N. P. 153. Cancelling the instru-
ment or security on payment of part by parole agreement executed, has been held
equivalent to a release. Silvers vs. Reynolds, 2 Harrison, 275.
2Wilkinson vs. Byers, 1 A. & E. 106; Adams vs. Japling, 4 Mod. 88; Sibree vs.
Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23; Tuttle vs. Tuttle, 12 Met. 554; Donohue vs. Woodbury,
6 Cush. 148.
3 Bryant vs. Goodnow, 5 Pick,- 228; Warren vs. Stearns, 19 Id. 7a; Robertson vs.
Iarch, 3 Scamm. 198; Macon vs. Sheppard, 2 Humph. 335; Univ. of Vt. vs. Buel,
2 Vt. 48; Common School Fund, vs. Perry, 5 Ohio, 58; Sperry vs. Johnson, 11
Id. 452; Barnes vs. Perine, 9 Barb. 202. If the subscription paper is under seal,
it is held that the seal imports a consideration whicli cannot be denied. Rutherford
vs. The Executive Committee, &c., 9 Gco. 54. But oven. then the paper must be
explicit, and contain a full contract. First Universalist Society in Newburyp6rt vs.
Currier, 3 Met. 417.
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lated conditions to the amount subscribed.1 Such subscriptions have
also been held binding where the subscribers promise .to share in
certain expenditures to be made for the benefit of all. Thus, if
several persons, members of a religious society, agree together to
take the shares s~t against their respective names, in a meeting-
house to be built for them, and to advance so much money on each
share to a treasurer to be elected, each subscriber to be interested
in the meeting-house proportionally to his subscription, the future
interest or benefit to be derived from the contributions of the co-
subscribers is a valid consideration. 2 Subject to these limitations,
the rule which requires a consideration to support a contract woiuld
deny validity to voluntary subscriptions for the purpose of educa-
tion, religion, charity, &c. So it has been decided in Maine,3 Mas-
sachusetts4 and very recently in New York," and to the same effect
dicta may be found in the reports of Ohio6 and Vermont.7
§ 40.-There are decisions which in principle seem to sustain all
voluntary subscriptions. Thus is New Hampshire, it has been held
" that where several agree to contribute to a common object, which
they wish to accomplish, the promise of each is a good consideration
for the promise of others."" In the early cases in Massach-Usetts,
they were denied yalidity, when no liabilities had been incurred on
faith of them,9 and in ofia case the subscribers were held, the pro-
posed expenditures having been made without any withdrawal or
" Holmes vs. Dana, 12 Mass. 190.
2 Thompson vs. Paige, 1 let. 570; Ives vs. Sterling. 6 Id. 310.
3 Foxcroft Academy vs. Ravor, 4 Greenl. 382.
4 Boutell vs. Cowden, 9 Mass. 254; Phillips Academy, vs. Davis, 11 Id. 114;
Bridgewater Academy vs. Gilbert, 2 Pick. 579. As to the liabilities of members of.
the voluntary unincorporated societies for assessments, fines, &c., see Warren vs.
Stearns, 19 Pick. 73; Nash vs. Russell, 5 Barb. 556.
5 Stewart vs. The Trustees of Hamilton College, 1 Comst. 581 ; Barnes vs. Perine,
9 Barb. 202; Aison vs. The Baptist Education Society, 10 Id. 308.
6 5 Ohio, 58.
7 Univ. of Vt., vs. Buel, 2 Vt. 48. But see 9 Id. 289.
8 George vs. Harris, 4 N. 11.533; Cong. Soc. in Troy vs. Perry, 6 Id. 504; Curry
vs. Rogers, 1 Foster, 247.
9 See cases cited snpra.
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dissent.' The: Supreme Court has since disregarded these pre-
cedents and attempted to sustain all voluntary subscriptions on the
ground that "it is a sufficient consideration that others Vere led to
subscribe by the very subscription of the defendant. '"z Still later,
it has noticed this conflict of opinion without attempting to settle it
or reconcile the cases--and so the law of Massachusetts on this
point is unsettled. In New York the authorities are in similar
conflict;' but recent cases discountenance the sweeping rule of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and hold that the endowment
of a literary institution is not a sufficient consideration to sutain a
subscription for that purpose. 5 If the validity of such subscriptions
shall yet be established, no liabilities having been incurred on ac-
count of them, it will be on the ground of a wise and just public
policy, which dictates in this instance a departure in .practice from
the common law requirement of a consideration, and some fictitious
consideration will be found to sustain it in theory.
§ 41.-Mandates.-It is well settled in the common law, that a
promise to do something about another's property without reward
is without consideration and void. 6  And on general principles, if
the trust was entered upon, it might be abandoned on partial per-
formance, unless such abandonment was tantamount to fraud. This
precise point has not been adjudicated, and there are dicta to the
effect that the acceptance of the trust binds the mandatary to its
I Farmington Academy vs. Allen, 14 Mass. 172.
2 Hanson vs. Stetson, 5 Pick. 506 ; Fisher vs. Ellis, 8 Id. 822 ; Amherst Academy
vs. Cowles, 6 Id. 427.
3 Ives vs. Sterling, 6 Met. 810.
4 R. Soc. Whitestown vs. Stone, 7 Johns. 112; McAuley vs. Billenger, 20Id. 89.
5 Stewart vs. The Trustees of Hamilton College, 1 Comst. 581; overruling the
same case in 2 Denio, 403; Barnes vs. Perine, 9 Barb. 202; Wilson vs. The Baptist
Education Society, 10 Id. 808. According to these authorities, such subscriptions
are not binding where no liabilities have been incurred on faith of Ihem, but there
are dicta in them which indicate that if the trustees agree to procure or to endeavor
to procure a certain sum for the institution or to invest or apply .it in a certain way
when procured; this, if distinctly stated in the agreement, would be a valid con-
sideration. See Caul vs. Gibson, 3 Barr, 416; Collier vs. The Baptist Education
Society, 8 B. Monr. 68; Blodgett vs. Munroe, 20 Vt. 509.
e Story Bail. 166.
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completion. But if, having been accepted, it is negligently or un-
skillfully performed by the niandatary, the bailor may recover
damages for his misfeasance.' This right to recover in such cases
is put on the ground of a breach of contract.2  If the promise to
accept the trust is 'void for want of a consideration, it is not easy
to discover how the acceptance supplies the defect. It has been
said a consideration must be presumed without which the promise
would not have been made 3-a doctrine which would give binding
force to every gratuitous promise. It is said also to bethe damage
which the bailee ultimately sustains 4 -a doctrine which would uphold
every gratuitous undertaking where damage results to the promisee
from the promisor's neglect to perform it. Most commonly, the
the bailee's "being trusted with the property," or the bailor's
"parting with the possession" is said to be the consideration. 5
These cannot constitute a consideration, for they are exclusively for
the benefit.of the bailor to whom the promise is made. If the
bailee is to receive any compensation in any shape whatever, and the
bailment is not exclusively for'the benefit of the bailor, it ceases to be
a mandate. 6 To this it is objected that the bailee is not at liberty
to commit a tort and set up the contract in defence.7  The gratui-
tous bailee is certainly liable for torts committed on the subject of
the trust. He has no more right to injure the property of another
voluntarily intrusted to him than that not thus intrusted. In
general, he is liable for that want of care and skill which he has
authorized the bailor' to expect from him. The law here, as in
other cases, will redress an innocent party for -the fraud or injury
of another, whether a valid contract subsists between them or not.8
It is not difficult to ascertain why the bailor's right of action against
I Coggs vs. Bernard, 1 Ld. Ray. 909 ; Elsee vs. Gatward, 5 T. R. 143 ; Thorne vs.
Deas, 4 Johns. 84. In Hen. IV. 33, it was held that no action would lie against a
carpenter who promised to build a house without a consideration-but otherwise if
he had begun the work and performed it unskillfully.
2 Chitty Cont. 38. 3 Cro. Eliz. 883. 4 Wheatley vs. Low, Palmer, 281.
5 Coggs vs. Bernard, 2 IA. Ray. 909; Holt C. J. Brown vs. Hay, 10 Iredell, 72,
Chitty Cont. 88; Story Baihm. 2, note.
6 Story Bailm. 153. 7 Story Bailm. 170.
8 16 Am. Law Jur. 253. See a learned article by Mr. Wallace.
